Every act of magic rests on an assumption.
Not an assumption about herbs, or planets, or the properties of candles, or the power of spoken words – though magic involves all of these. A more fundamental assumption, so basic that it is rarely stated explicitly, that underlies all of them.
The assumption is this: that consciousness is not merely a by-product of matter, a side effect of brain activity that has no causal power of its own, but something that participates in reality in a more active and fundamental way.
Without this assumption, magic makes no sense. If consciousness is simply what it looks like when neurons fire in the right configurations, (a kind of light that the brain emits, which illuminates nothing and causes nothing) then the idea that a practitioner’s focused intention could influence the physical world is straightforwardly incoherent. Intentions are brain states. Brain states are physical processes. Physical processes influence other physical processes through known physical mechanisms. The end.
But magic exists. People have practiced it, with varying degrees of effectiveness, for as long as there have been people. And the question of what consciousness actually is, what it does, how it relates to the physical world, and whether materialist accounts of it are complete remains one of the most contested and unresolved questions in contemporary philosophy and science
This is worth knowing. Because the practitioner who understands why the question of consciousness matters, who can see the philosophical territory that their practice is navigating, practices with more clarity and more honesty than the practitioner who simply assumes magic works and reaches for a spell.
The Hard Problem
The philosopher David Chalmers gave a name to what has always made consciousness philosophically difficult. He called it the hard problem of consciousness, and the name has stuck because it captures exactly what makes the question resistant to the usual scientific approaches.
The easy problems of consciousness – Chalmers uses the word easy not because they are simple but because they are, in principle, tractable by standard scientific method. Are questions about what the brain does. How does the brain integrate information from different sensory sources? How does it focus attention? How does it regulate sleep and waking? These are difficult questions in practice, but they are questions that neuroscience is equipped, in principle, to answer. They are questions about mechanism.
The hard problem is different. It is not about how the brain does what it does, but about why any of it feels like something. Why is there an inner life at all, a felt sense of what it is like to be you? Why does the processing of visual information in your visual cortex come with not just a functional response to light but the subjective experience of seeing red? Why is there experience at all, rather than just information processing in the dark?
This question cannot be answered by mechanism, because no description of mechanism, however detailed, however complete, explains why any of it is accompanied by experience rather than simply occurring without anyone home. You can describe the neural correlates of seeing red in complete detail and still be left with the question of why the seeing is experienced rather than simply happening.
This is not a gap that better neuroscience will fill. It is a conceptual problem. A problem about the relationship between the third-person descriptions of science and the first-person reality of experience that those descriptions are supposedly describing.
The Materialist Account and Its Discontents
The dominant view in contemporary Western science and philosophy is that consciousness is produced by the brain. That it emerges from physical processes in a way that will eventually be fully explained by neuroscience.
This view has obvious practical successes. Brain damage affects consciousness. Drugs affect consciousness. Anaesthesia temporarily eliminates conscious experience. The correlation between brain states and mental states is overwhelmingly well-established.
But correlation is not the same as explanation. The fact that consciousness correlates with brain states does not tell you what consciousness is, any more than the fact that a television program correlates with electromagnetic signals tells you what the program is about. Something is still missing.
The alternatives to materialism are varied and none of them is without difficulties of their own. Panpsychism – the view that consciousness or proto-conscious properties are fundamental features of the universe, present at some level in all matter – has gained serious philosophical attention in recent decades, partly because it offers a solution to the hard problem that materialism struggles to provide. If consciousness is not something that emerges from matter at a certain level of complexity but is instead a fundamental feature of reality that organizes itself into more complex forms of experience in more complex physical systems, then the question of why there is experience at all has a different shape.
Idealism – the view that consciousness is fundamental and matter is a construct of or within it – is the oldest serious alternative, with roots in Plato, in Vedantic philosophy, in Berkeley and Schopenhauer and Hegel. It has been unfashionable in the modern period but has not been refuted, and it has practitioners in contemporary philosophy who find it the most coherent position available.
Neither of these positions is the established consensus. What is the established consensus is that the hard problem is real, that materialism has not solved it, and that the question of what consciousness actually is remains genuinely open.
What This Means for Magical Practice
The practitioner who holds consciousness as a possibly fundamental feature of reality, rather than a mere by-product, is not holding an irrational or anti-scientific position. They are holding a position that is philosophically serious and that is consistent with everything known to science, while making an additional metaphysical claim that science has not settled.
The specific claim relevant to magic is that consciousness, focused, intentional, emotionally charged, is not merely passive experience but active participation in reality. That the world is not simply a collection of physical objects to which consciousness is a helpless spectator but something more interactive, in which the observing and intending mind is genuinely a participant.
This claim is ancient. It appears in every tradition of magical and mystical practice in the world. It has not been proven by modern science. But it has also not been disproven. And the philosophical case that consciousness is fundamental rather than derivative, that the hard problem cannot be solved by reducing experience to mechanism, leaves room for this claim that pure materialism does not.
Work with this as a working hypothesis rather than a certainty. Bring the same honest attention to your practice that you would bring to any other domain of genuine inquiry. Notice what happens. Notice what does not happen. Let the accumulation of your own experience inform your understanding of what you are doing, while holding your conclusions with appropriate tentativeness.
The question of what consciousness is remains open. Your practice is your own small contribution to the investigation.
